News & Events
Here we are giving you a peek into what keeps us busy, motivated and happy day in and day out.
Applied Crypto at Eurocrypt 2025 - Madrid
Some of our work will appear at Eurocrypt this spring!
- "On the Soundness of Algebraic Attacks against Code-based Assumptions" by Simon-Philipp Merz, Miguel Cueto Noval, Patrick Stählin, Akin Ünal.
- "Key Derivation Functions Without a Grain of Salt" by Matilda Backendal, Sebastian Clermont, Marc Fischlin and Felix Günther.
- "Analysis of the Telegram Key Exchange" by Martin R. Albrecht, Lenka Mareková, Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen, Igors Stepanovs.
Looking forward to the talks!
03.02.2025
Applied Crypto at RWC 2025 - Sofia
The Applied Cryptography Group will have a strong presence at this year's RWC, with 5 talks from our group accepted to the programme!
- "Breaking and Fixing Length Leakage in Content-Defined Chunking", by Kien Tuong Truong, Matteo Scarlata, Simon-Phillipp Merz, Felix Günther and Kenny Paterson.
- "D(e)rive with Care: Lessons Learned from Analyzing Real-World Multi-Input Key Derivation Functions", by Matilda Backendal, Sebastian Clermont, Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, Miro Haller and Matteo Scarlata.
- "Mind the Gap! Secure File Sharing, from Theory to Practice", by Matilda Backendal, David Balbás, Nicola Dardanis, Miro Haller and Matteo Scarlata.
- “Kemeleon: Elligator-like Obfuscation for Post-Quantum Cryptography”, by Felix Günther, Michael Rosenberg, Douglas Stebila and Shannon Veitch.
- "Provable Security for End-to-End Encrypted Cloud Storage", by Matilda Backendal, Hannah Davis, Felix Günther, Miro Haller, Kenny Paterson.
We look forward to sharing our research with the wider cryptographic community, and to network with all the awesome people attending RWC! See you in Sofia!
27.01.2025
Applied Crypto at Usenix Security 25
Francesca Falzon will be presenting her work with Tianxin Tang, a former postdoc in our group, titled "Learning from Functionality Outputs: Private Join and Compute (PJC) in the Real World" at this year's Usenix Security Symposium in August 2025.
PJC, a two-party protocol proposed by Google, is used for applications like ad conversion and generalizes their private set intersection sum protocol. It enables two parties with key-value databases to privately compute the inner product of values with intersecting keys. Although the output of this functionality is not usually included in the security model of multi-party computation (MPC), it could pose privacy risks in real-world applications.
Francesca and Tianxin's work examines these risks, focusing on an adversary within the protocol who could exploit four practical attacks to compromise the other party's input privacy. The study underscores the importance of considering functionality output in the MPC security model to mitigate these threats.
20.01.2025
